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Abstract — Large steps are being taken by the industry and 
R&D organizations in automated driving technology develop-
ment, as well as in setting up appropriate scenario-based safety 
assessment methods. In this paper a concept framework is pro-
posed for a very specific group of vehicles: trucks in a platoon 
enabled by vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V) communication. The basis is 
formed by previously proposed scenario-based assessment meth-
ods for individual automated driving vehicles. These methods 
however do not consider the inter-vehicle communication com-
ponent. It is shown how V2V communication interconnects vehi-
cles in a system-of-systems, and how to include V2V communica-
tion in the scenario description. The paper also provides a vision 
to answer the basic question whether safety assessment should 
consider the platoon as a whole, or the individual vehicle in the 
platoon.  
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The effort that is put into the development of automated 
vehicles by the industry is unmistakably very high. In the au-
tomation challenge, we distinguish between performance of 
perception, how well does the sensor system detect, identify, 
track and predict behavior of objects possibly interfering with 
the ego vehicle. And between the performance of control & de-
cision logic, how well is the ego vehicle capable of anticipating 
on this behavior as early as possible in the best possible way. 
Of course, if proper perception of the sensor system fails, then 
anticipation becomes very difficult or even impossible. The de-
velopment of a fair and reliable safety assessment framework 
is important for the safe deployment of automated vehicles on 
the public road, i.e. to test performance of perception and per-
formance of control & decision logic. Results are important for 
authorities to monitor the safety of vehicles that they allow on 
the road and to steer policy with regard to implementation of 
automated vehicles, and for the industry, to get an understand-
ing how their automated vehicle performs in terms of safety on 
the road, as early as in the development phase.  
Safety assessment frameworks that are based on real-world 
scenarios are considered to be a structured way of dealing with 
the infinite different situations that an automated vehicle needs 
to be able to deal with in a safe way when deployed on the 
public road [1, 2, 3, 4]. So far, safety assessment frameworks 
consider single automated vehicles that base their responses on 
their view at the surrounding traffic and its environment. Sen-
sor systems based on radar, lidar and/or camera techniques 
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collect that view, where sensor fusion on board of each indi-
vidual automated vehicle is used to build a single world model. 
The world model is the most important input to the automated 
vehicle’s decision and control logic, in order for the vehicle to 
provide an appropriate response.  
An important technology to enable higher levels of auto-
mation is V2X communication, which considers both the in-
formation exchange between vehicles and the infrastructure 
(V2I) and the information exchange between vehicles through 
V2V communication. The latter, V2V communication, is an 
indispensable technology to enable safe platooning of trucks. 
Platooning of long-haul trucks is expected to show large bene-
fits regarding reductions in fuel consumption [5],  improve-
ments of traffic throughput as a result of more efficient utiliza-
tion of road capacity and improved road safety by decreasing 
the role of the human in controlling the vehicle [6]. Regarding 
fuel consumption and traffic throughput, results improve with 
decreasing time-headway (THW†) between the trucks in the 
platoon. Conventional Advanced Cruise Control (ACC) sys-
tems, measuring relative velocity and distance with respect to 
the preceding vehicle in the platoon using sensors such as cam-
era, radar and/or lidar, are not able to assure string stability in 
the platoon unless relatively large intervehicle distances are 
chosen [7]. With V2V communication, string stability in the 
platoon can be achieved even for short following distances. 
In the European Horizon 2020 project ENSEMBLE [8], 
technology is developed to demonstrate heterogeneous multi-
brand truck platooning enabled by V2V communication. As 
current frameworks for safety assessment of (highly) auto-
mated vehicles do not take inter-vehicle communication (V2V) 
or more generic V2X into account, it is not possible to simply 
apply such a safety assessment framework to the use case of 
truck platooning. The European Horizon 2020 project 
HEADSTART [9] aims to define testing and validation proce-
dures of Connected and Automated Driving (CAD) functions 
and in this way supports the safety assessment of the truck pla-
tooning solutions developed in ENSEMBLE. This paper shows 
how the definition of the concept ‘scenario’ [10] is extended 
for applications making use of V2V communication and how 
safety assessment of a platoon of trucks may look like based on 
the extended scenario definition.  
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Fig. 1: Level A platooning according to the definitions from the 
ENSEMBLE project. 1) the leading truck is manually driven by a human 
driver; 2) the following truck has longitudinal automation, no lateral automa-
tion, hence the following truck are steered by human drivers; 3) the THW ≥ 
0.8 s during platooning; 4) new candidate truck can only engage the platoon 
from the rear. 
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION 
For performing a vehicle safety assessment, in the 
HEADSTART project [9] test cases will be determined for dif-
ferent use cases that specifically address Key Enabling Tech-
nologies (KETs) important for introducing Connected Cooper-
ative Automated Driving at a large scale. Vehicle-to-Every-
thing (V2X) communication is one of these KETs. 
ENSEMBLE truck platooning is selected as use case for 
HEADSTART, as V2V communication is key to enable pla-
tooning between vehicles (see Fig. 1).  
To arrive at appropriate and relevant test cases, a scenario-
based approach [11] is followed. A scenario gives a descrip-
tion of a situation that a vehicle might encounter during its 
lifetime on the road and to which the vehicle needs to respond 
appropriately: 
Definition  ― A scenario is a quantitative description of 
the ego vehicle, its activities and/or goals, its dynamic envi-
ronment (consisting of the traffic environment and the light & 
weather conditions) and its static environment. From the per-
spective of the ego vehicle, a scenario contains all relevant 
events. 
 
 
Fig. 2: Schematic view on the definition of scenario and the relation be-
tween scenarios and test case generation according to [11]. 
 
Fig. 3: Two essentially different ways of considering system boundaries for 
the platooning use case. Where the orange box considers the platoon as the 
system (of systems), the red box considers the individual vehicle. 
In this scenario definition, the role of communication between 
vehicles, important in a platoon for sharing intentions and to  
“extend” the sensor range, has not yet been considered. In ad-
dition, platoon actions are coordinated amongst the vehicles 
of the platoon, so received inputs can influence the outputs of 
V2V. In the next section, first the concept of platooning will 
be further elaborated before studying appropriate scenario ex-
tensions for safety assessment. 
III. PLATOONING 
In the ENSEMBLE project, platoon levels [8] are pro-
posed showing the level of automation of a platoon. In this 
paper, we focus on platooning Level A, as this is the first level 
of automation that will come to the road. If the extension of 
the scenario description works for Level A Platoons, then it is 
expected to work for the other levels as well. In a Level A 
Platoon, the first truck in the platoon is driven manually by a 
human driver, possibly supported by advanced driver assis-
tance systems (ADAS). The following trucks have fully auto-
mated longitudinal control, whereas a (safety) driver in each 
of these trucks is responsible to keep the following truck in its 
lane, though also such lateral control of the truck might be 
supported with an ADAS system. The time headway between 
trucks is minimal 0.8 seconds, and can be (automatically) 
adapted for local situations, e.g. to 1,5 seconds for downhill 
conditions, or manually adjusted to driver preferences. New 
candidate trucks can only engage the platoon from the rear. 
In Fig. 3, the transmission and reception of V2V and I2V 
(from Infrastructure) messages is schematically shown: 
• Communication is performed from one truck to the next 
truck; bidirectional communication is established to con-
trol the platoon and the individual trucks in the platoon 
[12]. 
• The leading truck is in the lead of the platoon. Following 
trucks can provide ‘constraints’ to the platoon, e.g. as a 
result of their weight, their braking capacity, so that the 
leading truck can include that for the platooning cohesion 
and strategic decisions.  
• A distinction is made between tactical platoon manage-
ment messages (relevant for all platoon members and 
near-real time criticality) and platoon control messages 
(operational layer) that are required for controlling the in-
dividual trucks (acceleration-deceleration-cruising). The 
platoon control messages are of real-time nature, low-la-
tency and mostly locally relevant: for the vehicle listening 
to the vehicle in front. 
• A truck wanting to engage can transmit a Join Request to 
the Trailing truck; the Trailing truck will answer with a 
  
Join Response with information on request acceptance 
and with connection and platoon configuration details. 
• In ENSEMBLE also a security framework is used to set-
up secure communications [13]. These mechanisms are 
out-of-scope for the current paper. These mechanisms are 
not relevant for our analyses and make the descriptions 
unnecessarily complex.  
• Level A platooning allows for reception of information 
from the infrastructure, mostly strategic information such 
as advised following distance, traffic rules such as the 
speed limit and local traffic conditions. This information 
is intended to be received by each individual truck and by 
the platoon leader to take a decision. 
 
IV. SAFETY ASSESSMENT 
A fundamental choice needs to be made for the safety as-
sessment of platooning trucks, as there are two possible ap-
proaches: 
A. Assessment of the platoon as a system-of-vehicles 
In the system-of-vehicles, the vehicles are cooperating fol-
lowing agreed rules on the use of V2X messages (the platoon-
ing protocol). This is the system boundary indicated by the or-
ange bounding box in Fig. 3: 
• Vehicles are able to receive messages from other vehicles 
in the platoon (V2V) and from the environment (I2V) and 
interpret these, like sensors that make an image of the en-
vironment as input to the decision and control of the ve-
hicle. 
• Transmission of messages is considered similar to the use 
of the actuators, such as steering, braking or gas pedal ac-
tuation. Input to the actuators is received from the deci-
sion and control algorithms. A transmitted V2V message 
is intended as input to the decision and control of one 
other vehicle in the platoon. 
• The only information crossing the system boundary con-
siders messages received from the infrastructure (this is 
one-way communication from the infrastructure to each 
truck) and the information exchange in case a new truck 
wants to participate in the platoon, and similar in case the 
last truck has decided to disengage from the platoon. 
  
B. Assessment of the response of the individual vehicle  
In case individual vehicles are assessed, it is important to 
consider that the vehicles are part of a platoon, and that the 
vehicles respond also to input received by communication‡  
(system boundary indicated by red bounding box in Fig. 3): 
• Information is received from the vehicle in front and from 
the vehicle to the rear (V2V) for interpretation of decision 
and control software (very similar to a sensor). 
• Moreover, a different type of information is received from 
the infrastructure, e.g. information on speed limit, desired 
time-headway, etc. 
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Fig. 4: Control layers used in ENSEMBLE truck platooning, where DCL 
represents the decision and control logic for an individual vehicle. 
• Input from the decision and control software in the truck 
is used for the actuators and similarly to transmit opera-
tional messages. This is used by the vehicle to the rear for 
operational control (e.g. longitudinal vehicle following). 
This is typically part of the operational layer (see Fig. 4) 
and has a real-time nature. So this is V2V communication 
with low-latency and high update rates. The messages for 
platoon management are of a more tactical nature, so less 
time stringent, but of interest for all platoon members (up-
stream and downstream) to share status and coordinate 
platoon maneuvers.  
• The information crossing the system boundary considers 
messages received from the infrastructure (one-way com-
munication, tactical and/or strategic layer information), 
and the messages received from the preceding and follow-
ing truck. Additionally the messages generated by the in-
dividual truck as a result of decision and control (similar 
to actuation) cross the system boundary. These outgoing 
messages only target the preceding truck or the following 
truck. 
 
C. Consider the role of the truck in the platoon 
Although one might expect a result regarding the safety of 
a platoon as a whole when assessing the platooning use case, 
it is more meaningful to address the safety of an individual 
vehicle in the platoon. For Level A platooning, each individual 
vehicle remains responsible to behave safely, also as part of 
the platoon. Another fundamental argument results from the 
fact that we consider multi-brand platooning, which means 
that for each individual vehicle that has platooning function-
ality on board, the safety of this functionality needs to be as-
sessed. Consequently, we propose to choose for assessing in-
dividual vehicles regarding its platooning functionality. The 
assessment needs to consider the different roles that a vehicle 
can have in a platoon (leader, follower, trailing), as its function 
changes with that role.  
If we only would consider the platoon as a whole, then we 
would need to find a solution for the fact that platoons might 
have different compositions, with a different number of 
trucks, cooperation between different type of trucks and a dif-
ferent order of trucks in the platoon. In that case, safety assess-
ment needs to be performed on all possible platoon configura-
tions, which is simply not feasible.  
standardized yet, but this work also contributes to ETSI TR 103 298: ITS; 
Platooning; Pre-standardization Study. 
  
V. ADDING COMMUNICATION TO THE SCENARIO 
DESCRIPTION 
The choice made in the previous section is relevant for the 
way scenario descriptions are impacted by adding communi-
cation. Now, from its definition, a scenario takes the perspec-
tive of the individual vehicle, which will not change. Actually, 
an additional information layer is needed for the scenario con-
cept to deal with the information that is perceived (received) 
by the platooning vehicle. The assessment process moreover 
needs to consider whether the vehicle transmits appropriate 
signals (according to specification) based on provided input 
(also from V2V communication). Vehicle control and deci-
sion making by the individual truck depends on the V2V and 
I2V inputs that the truck receives. Moreover, often also the 
content of the transmitted V2V messages of the individual 
truck, depends on the information previously received by the 
individual truck. 
In Fig. 4, the three possible roles for a platooning truck are 
indicated. A fourth role is a platoon candidate, that is a truck 
that wants to engage into the platoon (from the rear in case of  
Level A platooning). It appears that for platooning it is im-
portant to indicate the position of the truck in the platoon. 
When the specific functionality of a vehicle is coupled to a 
scenario, this is called a use case. So in the description of the 
use case “Platooning”, it needs to be indicated what the role 
of the truck in the platoon is. Based on the role, a selection of 
applicable scenario categories can be made. In the description 
of the scenario, then also the communication layer is consid-
ered. The communication input signals are part of the sce-
nario, and scenario evolution, the transmitted V2V messages 
of the truck – as part of the total response of the truck, is part 
of the performance assessment. The information flow to and 
from individual trucks in the platoon depending on their role 
has been schematically shown in Fig. 5 and Fig. 6. 
 
A. Example scenario  
We use the example of a 3-vehicle platoon consisting of a 
lead truck, a following truck and a trailing truck, running into 
 
 
Fig. 5: System boundaries for the Trailing truck, the Following truck and 
the Leading truck. 
 
Fig. 6: Role of a “new” candidate truck asking permission to engage in the 
platoon. 
 
§ Least performing in the sense of deceleration profile which is the result 
of the braking capability in combination with the payload of each truck. 
the tail of a traffic jam, to explain how the existing scenario 
information needs to be extended with communication infor-
mation (in italics). We start the scenario description providing 
the initial state from which the scenario commences: 
• The platoon is driving in the right lane of a 3-lane high-
way with a speed of 80 km/h. In front of the leading truck 
is a passenger car (at 80 km/h), at a given time-headway.  
• The road is not equipped with display panels at gantries 
over the road that warn for a traffic jam, indicating an ap-
propriate speed limit and using flashing amber lights next 
to the display panels for additional warning.  
• The scenario commences as the passenger car preceding 
the leading truck starts to brake with 3 m/s2 in anticipa-
tion of the upcoming traffic jam. 
Subsequently, we will provide the scenario descriptions for 
each of the trucks, considering the role of the truck in the pla-
toon. The input-output schemes for the different roles in the 
platoon are provided in Fig. 7 and Fig. 8. 
B. Leading truck 
The Platoon Leader is driven by a human driver. The driver 
is supported by an Advanced Driver Assistance System that 
uses a sensor system to get a view on the traffic in front and to 
the side of the truck, so the Platoon Leader is in ACC mode. 
Sensor inputs are used to build and continuously update a 
world model that the Automated Driving System (with pla-
tooning functionality) of the leading truck uses to support the 
driver, to adapt the speed, acceleration and steering angle and 
to communicate its intentions to the following trucks. In its 
decisions, the leading truck also makes use of information it 
receives from the following trucks and from I2V. For the cur-
rent example, we assume no additional information from I2V  
to be present. 
 
1) Intention of the leading truck 
• Safely decrease speed to a level that is appropriate for 
the traffic jam with a deceleration that does not exceed 
that of the least performing§ truck in the platoon. For 
this it is assumed that the driver of the Platoon Leader 
is aware of the traffic jam by visual observation.  
• Communicate this intention and the according brak-
ing deceleration and speed or gap (THW) adjustment 
to the following trucks with the shortest possible de-
lay. 
• Continuously monitor the deceleration profile of the 
preceding passenger car, the THW and the TTC (time-
to-collision). 
• Communicate the reason for speed or gap adjust-
ments downstream into the platoon as a result of the 
current scenario (approaching the tail of a traffic 
jam). 
  
 
     
  
 
 
 
Fig. 7: Input-output scheme for the different roles in a platoon: for leading, 
following and trailing truck. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 8: Input-output scheme for new trucks with the intention to engage 
into the platoon. 
  
2) Driver supporting sensor system of the leading truck 
• The leading truck notices the preceding vehicle brak-
ing at a distance of 300 m to the tail of the traffic jam. 
• The traffic jam covers all three lanes, the last vehicles 
in the queue use flashing blinkers to indicate a strong 
reduction in speed. The actual traffic jam consists of 
slow driving and often standing still vehicles. 
 
3) Communication regarding the leading truck 
• The leading truck is aware (due to earlier communica-
tion during platoon engagement) of the platoon state 
regarding the number of trucks, the THW between the 
trucks  and the max. braking capability of the least 
performing truck in the platoon. 
• There is no I2V information, so no additional infor-
mation is received from the traffic management center 
(such as warning for a traffic jam – minutes before ac-
tually running into it, or speed advice.)  
 
C. Following truck 
The first following truck is platooning at 1.5 s THW to the 
leading truck. The trailing truck is platooning at 1.5 s THW 
from the first following truck. The platooning functionality 
uses longitudinal control only, to keep the THW to the preced-
ing truck constant; a human driver controls the steering wheel 
to keep the following truck into its lane. The sensor system 
monitors the preceding truck, and also checks for unexpected 
maneuvers of other traffic participants, e.g. to anticipate on a 
vehicle cutting through the platoon in between the leading 
truck and the following truck – which would change the sce-
nario for the following truck(s). 
 
1) Intention of the following truck 
• Keep the THW with respect to the leading truck. 
• Receive and follow the deceleration and speed profile 
that the leading truck has communicated down the 
platoon. 
• Continuously monitor the THW and the TTC (time-
to-collision) with respect to the leading truck and 
adapt the deceleration where necessary. 
• Communicate ego intentions and related platoon co-
hesion information to the leading truck and the trail-
ing truck with the shortest possible delay. 
• Receive platoon cohesion information of the trailing 
truck to inform the leading truck. 
 
2) Sensor system of the following truck 
• The following truck monitors the position and speed 
of the leading truck. 
• In addition, the sensor system monitors the road users 
that possibly interfere with the platoon, e.g. by cutting 
through the platoon in between the leading and the fol-
lowing truck.  
 
3) Communication regarding the following truck 
• The following truck receives information from the 
leading truck on the requested deceleration and speed 
profile or gap adaptations for the platoon.  
• It also receives platoon cohesion information from the 
trailing truck e.g. desired maximum platoon speed, 
maximum acceleration request. 
• There is no I2V considered, so no additional infor-
mation is received from the traffic management cen-
ter. 
 
D. Trailing truck 
The trailing truck is platooning at 1.5 s THW from the first 
following truck. The platooning functionality uses longitudi-
nal control only, to keep the THW to the preceding truck con-
stant; a human driver controls the steering wheel to keep the 
following truck into its lane. The sensor system monitors the 
preceding truck, and also checks for unexpected maneuvers of 
other traffic participants, e.g. to anticipate on a vehicle cutting 
through the platoon in between the following truck and the 
trailing truck – which would change the scenario for the trail-
ing truck. 
 
1) Intention of the trailing truck 
• Keep the THW with respect to the truck in front. 
• Receive and follow the deceleration and speed profile 
that the leading truck has communicated down the 
platoon. 
• Continuously monitor the THW and the TTC (time-
to-collision) with respect to the following truck and 
adapt the deceleration where necessary. 
• Communicate this intention and related platoon cohe-
sion information to the following truck. 
 
2) Sensor system of the trailing truck 
• The trailing truck monitors the position and speed of 
the following truck. 
• In addition, the sensor system monitors the road users 
that possibly interfere with the platoon, e.g. by cutting 
through the platoon in between the following and the 
trailing truck. 
 
3) Communication regarding the trailing truck 
• The trailing truck receives information from the pre-
ceding truck on the requested deceleration profile.  
• It also receives information from a Platoon Candidate, 
a new truck that expresses its intention to join the pla-
toon, incl. its max. braking capability. 
• A decision on whether or not to allow a Platoon Can-
didate to engage is transmitted to the Platoon Candi-
date via a Join Response message. 
• If a Platoon Candidate is allowed to Join, additional 
information is shared about platoon configuration: 
Platoon ID, communication configuration, and num-
ber of trucks. 
• When the engage has finished successfully, related 
platoon configurations are updated accordingly (e.g. 
platoon roles, position in the platoon, number of vehi-
cles in platoon). This information is aggregated and 
forwarded from rear to front. 
• There is no I2V, so no additional information is re-
ceived from the traffic management center.  
  
E. Platoon candidate 
In case a Platoon Candidate intends join the platoon, it 
transmits a Join Request to the trailing truck of the platoon. 
This request is handled locally by the trailing truck as it has 
all the information available to decide whether or not to allow 
the new truck to engage from the rear based on a set of re-
quirements, such as: 
• The maximum number of trucks in the platoon should 
not have been reached. 
• The new truck should be able to communicate accord-
ing to the same protocol as the trucks in the platoon. 
• The maximum deceleration capability of the new 
truck matches that of the already participating trucks 
in the platoon sufficiently. 
• The situation allows for the engaging maneuvers to be 
conducted safely without adding hazard to the platoon 
or other road users. 
 
VI. DISCUSSION 
The example shows how a scenario translates into input to 
the cooperative automated driving system (CADS), by the 
sensor system, by V2X communication, and by the driver (for 
the leading truck, as well as by the safety driver in the other 
trucks in the platoon). The decision and control logic of the 
CADS on-board each vehicle in the platoon interprets the in-
coming signals and continuously provides a response. This re-
sponse results in control of the actuators, the transmission of 
information across the platoon, and information on an HMI to 
the driver. A scenario for a given truck in the platoon is de-
scribed by indicating the intention of the truck (based on its 
role), the (dynamic) behaviour of the road users in the direct 
environment of the truck (which obviously includes the be-
haviour of the other truck(s) in the platoon whenever relevant) 
as monitored by the sensor system, the received information 
through V2V and I2V communication. For the safety assess-
ment of a truck in a platoon, this would lead to at least the 
following tests: 
1. Sensor perception tests: how well do the sensors in the sen-
sor set perceive the maneuvers of other road users and objects 
in the infrastructure (lines, lane markings, traffic signs, etc.), 
and how accurate is the resulting world model for different 
lighting and weather conditions? 
2. Communication (V2X) tests: what is the quality of the com-
munication, is the channel uncongested, are V2V messages 
delayed, or lost, from preceding and following vehicles? How 
does this quality depend on the scenario, e.g. by influences 
from its environments: infrastructure elements such as tun-
nels, bridges, or gantries, or from weather conditions? 
3. Open loop tests: what is the output of the CADS in response 
to the various inputs? In open loop tests, the set points for con-
trol of the actuators are determined and recorded, but not used 
for actual actuation. Moreover, the messages for broadcasting 
information up and down the platoon are formulated and rec-
orded for an offline consistency check. 
4. Closed-loop tests: these are the tests in which the set points 
determined by the CADS are used to control the vehicle. 
This includes the transmission of information, and using 
the received information from V2V communication in the 
determination of set points and to update outgoing V2V 
messages. 
A set of open-loop and closed-loop tests is required for each 
role that a truck may play in the platoon. Such tests should 
also evaluate the role-awareness of each individual truck in 
the platoon. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
For the safety assessment of trucks with V2V platooning 
functionality, a methodology has been proposed that considers 
the role of the individual truck in the platoon. In this way, each 
individual truck is tested for its role, given a set of test cases 
based on scenarios that not only describe the intent of the ve-
hicle-under-test, the static & dynamic environment and the en-
vironmental conditions, but also the messages that are com-
municated between the vehicles (V2V communication) and 
between infrastructure and the vehicle-under-test (V2I). Since 
the communication layer is added to the scenario descriptions, 
the scenarios have become dependent on the chosen commu-
nication protocol for platooning. In the paper the protocol ac-
cording to the ENSEMBLE project is followed.  
As the next step, the set of relevant test cases needs to be 
collected, e.g. using a StreetWise approach [14]. For each of 
the relevant highway scenarios the communication layer needs 
to be added referring to the role of the truck-under-assessment 
and according to the selected communication protocol. 
This approach enables the safety assessment of platoons 
by assessing the individual trucks. Close-loop tests can be per-
formed either in a virtual model environment, on a test track, 
or in a X-in-the-loop environment, and the open-loop tests 
might even be performed on the public road.  
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